Louisiana Law Review
Volume 57
Number 1 Fall 1996

Article 13

11-1-1996

Duty, Risk & the Spectre of Solidarity in Louisiana Tort Law
Kyle Duncan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Kyle Duncan, Duty, Risk & the Spectre of Solidarity in Louisiana Tort Law, 57 La. L. Rev. (1996)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol57/iss1/13

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

COMMENT
Duty, Risk & the Spectre of Solidarity in Louisiana Tort
Law
I. INTRODUCTION

With the amendment of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2323, 2324(B) and
2324(C), the Louisiana Legislature may well have fired the decisive shot in a series
of legal skirmishes with the Louisiana Supreme Court over the meaning and
significance of solidary liability in our tort law.' Simply put, new Articles 23232
and 2324' seem to abolish solidary liability between joint tortfeasors whose
concurrent negligence combines to injure a third party. Whatever the current state
of solidary liability may be, however, our courts and our lawmakers have taken a
tortuous path to arrive there. This comment will explore some of the more recent
twists and turns on that convoluted journey.
To appreciate the current state of solidary liability in tort, it is important to
understand how Louisiana courts have, over the last thirty years, employed the
"duty/risk" analysis in the various contexts of contributory negligence, comparative
fault and finally solidarity itself. This comment, then, will begin with a discussion

Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. See generally Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Ongoing "Turf War"for
Louisiana Tort Law: Interpreting Immunity and the Solidary Skirmish, 56 La. L. Rev. 215 (1995).
2. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (eff. April 16, 1996) provides:
A. In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death or loss, the degree or
percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury, death or loss shall
be determined, regardless ofwhether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and
regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but
not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not
known or reasonably ascertainable. If a person suffers injury, death or loss as the result
partly of his own negligence and partly as the result of the fault of another person or
persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree
or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
B. The provisions of Paragraph A shall apply to any claim for recovery of damages for
injury, death or loss asserted under any law or legal doctrine or theory of liability,
regardless of the basis of liability.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs A and B, if a person suffers injury,
death or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of
an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.
3. The amended portions of La. Civ. Code art. 2324 provide:
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability for damages caused by
two or more persons shall be ajoint and divisible obligation. Ajoint tortfeasor shall not be
liable for more than his degree offault and shall not besolidarily liable with any other person
for damages attributable to the fault of such other person, including the person suffering
injury, death or loss, regardless ofsuch other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of
fault, immunity by statute or otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided
in R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable.
C. lnterruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint
tortfeasors.
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of the duty/risk analysis in its original context: contributory negligence. It will
then trace how courts adapted duty/risk to different legal theories, and finally it will
examine how the analysis impacted the ever-changing law of solidary liability.
Two recent decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court will be ofparticular interest:
Veazey v. Elmwood PlantationAssociates, Inc.' and Turner v. Masslha.5 This
comment will conclude by assessing the current state of solidarity and by
speculating on what role the duty/risk analysis might play in shaping future law in
this area.
II. DUTY AND RISK INLOUISIANA
Ofall the substantivetorts problems with which ajudge must contend it
seen to me thatthe most exasperatingand elusiveis thatofdetermining
howfar legalprotection shouldextend.
Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It
Yourself Versus American Beverage Company6

A. Dixie Drive It Yourself
Thus did Professor Malone begin both an insightful exploration of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's reasoning in DixieDriveIt YourselfSystem v. American
BeverageCompany'and also a calculated attack on that "assortment of generalities
that parade in the law books under the banner of 'proximate cause.'"" Malone saw
the Dixie case as a watershed in Louisiana tort law insofar as it "suggest[ed] a more
realistic attack upon the entire phenomenon ofnegligence liability."' This "more.
realistic attack" consisted of discarding the vagaries of "proximate cause"
language'0 and adopting the clearer, indeed the more "honest,"" duty/risk
approach to defining the limits of a tortfeasor's liability.

4. 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994).
5. 656 So. 2d 636 (La. 1995).
6. 30 La. L. Rev. 363 (1970).
7. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
8. Malone, supra note 6, at 363.
9. Id. at 368.
10. Regarding the multitude of "nonsense phrases that make up the world of proximate cause,"
Malone, supra note 6, at 363 n.2, referred his readers to Jesse D. McDonald, Proximate Cause in
Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. 391 (1956). Malone's own estimation of the usefulness ofproximate cause
language, however, is so pungent as to merit repeating here:
Few judges of today would seriously question the observation that the phrases of

proximate cause are little more than gaudy ribbons with which the package of liability
may be decorated once its contents have already been fixed by the court through resort
to some other mystique.
Id. at 364.
11. Malone, supra note 6, at 364.

1996]

COMMENT

The facts of the Dixie case bear repeating here as a context for the
discussion of the duty/risk approach. Plaintiff (Dixie) had leased its truck to
Gulf States Screw Products Company (Gulf). Gulf's employee Langtre was
driving the truck down U.S. Highway 61 toward New Orleans when he
encountered defendant's (American Beverage Co.) RC Cola truck stopped on the
highway. Defendant's truck had stalled about ten minutes earlier, and the driver
"did not display signal flags on the highway or take any other action to protect
approaching traffic,"' 2 in contravention of Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:241
and 32:442. Given the combination of misting conditions that day and Langtre's
admitted inattentiveness, Langtre did not perceive that the RC Cola truck was
stationary until it was too late: he collided with defendant's truck." Plaintiff
alleged that defendant's employee had violated the statutory duties imposed by
Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:241 and 32:442 and was therefore negligent
The trial court and the court of appeal for the fourth circuit denied plaintiff
recovery. 4 Malone noted that the appellate court did not bother to explain why
it did so, but speculated that "the court was influenced by some assumed rule
that would arbitrarily place the legal responsibility upon the last culpable human
actor in point of time, and exempt all those antecedent to him."'" The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. That in itself was not significant, since, as
Malone commented,' 6 the court could have reversed under the proximate cause
rubric of intervening/superseding cause. What was significant, however, was the
supreme court's rationale for finding that plaintiff could recover:
The essence of the present inquiry is whether the risk and harm
encountered by the plaintiff fall within the scope of protection of the
statute. It is a hazard problem. Specifically, it involves a determination
of whether the statutory duty of displaying signal flags and responsibility for protecting traffic were designed, at least in part, to afford
protection to the class of claimants of which plaintiff is a member from
the hazard of confused or inattentive drivers colliding with stationary
vehicles on the highway.'7
Following this rationale, the supreme court concluded that the "objective of
the statutory provisions violated" by the defendant was to protect against the very
inattentiveness of which Langtre was guilty.'"

12. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 476, 137 So. 2d
298, 300 (1962).
13. An overtaking automobile prevented Langtre from pulling into the left lane to pass
defendant's stalled vehicle. Id.
14. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 128 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961).
15. Malone, supra note 6, at 366.
16. Id. at 368-69.
17. Dixie, 242 La. at 488, 137 So. 2d at 304.
18. Id. at 492. 137 So. 2d at 306.
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B. What Duty Meant in Dixie
Malone extolled the Dixie court's approach for two reasons. First, he felt
the court had made "a major contribution to the clear analysis of negligence
cases"' 9 by confronting the cause-in-fact question as a purely factual one,
having nothing to do with policy considerations.20 Second, and more pertinent
to this discussion, Malone announced that the court had made "a direct policy
assault on the problem"'" of how far to extend the scope of defendant's duty.
Specifically, the court had
turned to the criminal statute whose violation had served to make the
defendant's conduct wrongful and it inquired as to whether this statute
should be so construed as to extend protection against the risk, or
hazard, that later a confused or inattentive motorist approaching from
the rear might fail to advert to the danger ahead unless he were given
specific advance warning by the light or flag required by the statute.2
In this Ruminations article, Malone explained what the court's role in the
duty/risk analysis should be. First, although adopting the criminal statute as a
standard, the court should treat this standard as malleable, subject to the court's
own appraisal of the particular circumstances. When the law itself offered no
guidance as to what "risks" the lawmakers enacting it had in mind, the coull
"must be guided solely by its own unaided judgment as to whether the statutory
rule is appropriate to the very special risk or hazard presented by the facts of the
controversy at hand." 23 Stated another way, whatever statute or rule of law the
court chose as a guide in delineating the extent of a tortfeasor's duty should not
be not binding upon it; rather, the analysis "makes possible a free range for the
exercise of the judge's own talent."2'
Second, Malone by no means imagined that the duty/risk approach should
be restricted to statutory duties; to the contrary, he stated that "[t]here is sound
reason for extending to judge-made rules the same approach that prevails for
rules enacted in criminal statutes or ordinances. 25 Since what is commonly
called negligence is simply "a mass of particularized duties which share a
common characteristic called 'reasonable behavior, '26 courts could appropriately turn to the duty/risk analysis to mark out the liability of a tortfeasor who,
instead of violating a statutory duty as in Dixie, breached a "judge-made"

19.
20.
21.

Malone, supra note 6, at 372.
Id. at 370-373.
Id. at 374.

22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 378.

24.
25.
26.

Id. at 383.
Id. at 387.
Id.
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Malone cited cases subsequent to Dixie"5 which employed the du-

ty/risk approach to the violation of a jurisprudential, rather than a statutory, duty.
C. What Duty Meant in Hill

In Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.,2 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that when defendant home repair contractor negligently left a ladder standing
against a home, defendant's violation of duty did not encompass the risk that an
unknown third-party would lay the ladder down in the yard, and that a maid
employed in the house would later trip over it and injure herself. The court
framed the "duty" inquiry as
whether the risk of injury from a ladder lying on the ground, produced
by a combination of defendant's act and that of a third party, is within
the scope of protection of a rule of law which would prohibit leaving

a ladder leaning against the house.3°

The court found that defendant's duty did not include the specific risk which
plaintiff encountered, reasoning that no "evidence" showed that "defendant could
have reasonably anticipated that a third person would move the ladder and put
it in the position which created this risk .... .""
Writing about Hill,"2 Professor David Robertson praised the court for
holding fast to the doctrines ofcause-in-fact and duty/risk elucidated in Dixie and
also for affirming that "the approach (i.e. duty/risk) is to be applied to breaches
of case-law duties"3 as well as statutory duties. While noting that the duty/risk
approach was not a sure vaccine against the vague language of proximate
cause,' he added that the analysis offered distinct advantages over proximate

27. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis added).
28. See.e.g., Vidrine v. General Fire &Casualty Co.. 168 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964)
(City of Ville Platte's violation of its duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of traffic signals
included risk of an unwary motorist failing to yield at an intersection), in Malone, supra note 6, at
386-87; Dartez v. City of Sulfur, 179 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Ci. 1965) (City of Sulfur's violation
of its duty not to obstruct sidewalk by leaving bent parking meter unrepaired did not include risk that
a pedestrian would trip on baling wire and fall onto the meter), inMalone, supra note 6, at 388-89;
Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 219 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (duty not to run into
parked car on the street does not include the risk that the owner in a nearby house will come to the
scene of the accident, become mentally disturbed over the damages to his car, and have a heart
attack), in Malone, supranote 6, at 390 n.55.
29. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
30. Hill, 260 La. at 544, 256 So. 2d at 622.
31. Id. at 551, 256 So. 2d at 623.
32. David W. Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v.
Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 La. L. Rev. 1(1973).
33. Robertson, supra note 32, at 20 n,46.
34. In fact, Robertson admitted that "the two formulations (i.e. proximate cause and duty/risk)
are rather easily translatable, one into the other." and that duty/risk, like proximate cause, was
"ultimately the articulation of a conclusion, rather than an explanation of its grounds." Id. at 15.
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cause: (1) it was "clearer and infinitely more cogent" ' in accounting for and
predicting judicial outcomes; (2) it was "far more honest"36 in admitting the
"inevitability of human choice";" (3) it was "more evocative"3 in' that it
recognized the importance of policy as a factor (although it didn't invite "very
extensive discussion of the underlying policy factors");3 9 and, (4) it "ma[de]
more sense'1 ° regarding the relative capacities of judge and jury.
Robertson explained that when the court interpreted the scope of a judgecreated (as opposed to a statutory) duty, it should approach the problem as if it
were dealing with a legislative pronouncement: "[t]he same policy considerations which would motivate a legislative body to impose duties to protect from
certain risks are applied by the court in making its determination."14 ' And in
assessing whether the risk encountered was within the scope of defendant's duty,
the "proper inquiry," as the Hill court put it, was "[t]he ease of association ofthe
injury with the rule relied upon ... "4, "Ease of association" included
"foreseeability" of the risk as one of its elements, but the concept was much
broader than that: it asked whether a defendant could have "reasonably
' that his
anticipated" 43
breach of duty would lead to such a risk of injury.
D. The Duty/Risk "Approach"
In Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself, Wex Malone emphasized that
there was "no such thing as the rule of the Dixie decision which might require
that the case be distinguished in future litigation."" David Robertson echoed
this idea when he identified the didactic function of the Hill decision as
"provid[ing] an efficient and clear way of stating and seeing the problem."' 5
The Dixie and Hill decisions thus were not examples of the court's originality
in facing a difficult factual situation. In the rationale of those cases lay, instead,
an overarching philosophy about the role the court was to play in negligence
cases. Under the duty/risk approach the court would give a clear and honest
assessment of why it found a particular tortfeasor responsible for a particular set
of damages. Rather than festooning its decision with the "gaudy ribbons"" of

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.

40.

Id.

41.
42.
43.

Id. at S.
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542, 551, 256 So. 2d 620, 622 (1972).
Id. at 551, 256 So. 2d at 623. Robertson notes that it is difficult to articulate the precise

difference between "anticipate" and "foresee." Robertson, supra note 32, at 9.
44. Malone, supra note 6, at 393.
45. Robertson, supra note 32, at 13.
46. See supra note 10.
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proximate cause, the court would deliver its pronouncements in the plain brown
wrapper of duty/risk.
III. DUTY/RISK AND COMPARATIVE FAULT
A. Contributory Negligence v. ComparativeFault
Dixie did not involve the issue of victim fault.47 The negligence of the
approaching driver (Langtre) could not be attributed to the plaintiff (Dixie),
because their relationship was one of bailment, and not one of employment."
The court merely had to decide whether Langtre's negligence "superseded" that
of the American Beverage Company's driver and thus became the "sole cause"
of the accident. As noted above, the court used the duty/risk approach to
conclude that the violation of the defendant's statutory duties included the risk
of Langtre's negligence.
Had Langtre's negligence been attributable to the plaintiff, 9 then the court
would have faced the question ofthe relationship between the newborn duty/risk
approach and the perennial bar to a plaintiff's recovery, contributory negligence.10 Presumably, the court could have used the same approach to find that,
given the breadth of defendant's duty, plaintiff's contributory negligence should
not bar recovery."' The court did use such reasoning in Baumgartnerv. State
Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,52 and concluded that defendant motorist's duty
extended to protect plaintiff, an intoxicated pedestrian, against his own
carelessness in crossing the street.
But the question of what place duty/risk should occupy in the contributory
negligence scheme became moot when the Louisiana legislature instituted a
system of "pure" comparative fault by amending Louisiana Civil Code article
2323," effective August 1, 1980. A new question arose, however: how was
the duty/risk approach to fit into the scheme of comparative fault?

47. Hill did not involve victim fault, either. The issue there was strictly whether or not the
defendant was to be responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
48. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 480, 137 So. 2d
298, 301 (1962).
49. If, for example, Langtre were Dixie's employee, Dixie would have been vicariously liable
for Langtre's negligence.
50. See La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (1870).
51. Courts were becoming, and after Dixie would become, increasingly less tolerant of the
harshness of the contributory bar. Thus, they would resort to certain logical devices in order to
circumvent the rule. For example, courts would rule that plaintiff could still recover ifdefendant had
the last "clear chance" to avoid the injury. See Alston Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the
Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev. 319, 324 & n.21 (1980).
52. 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978). See Johnson, supra note 51, at 330, for a discussion of the
case.
53. 1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 1.
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At first blush, after all, the two approaches might appear somewhat
incompatible. The goal of comparative fault was to reach more equitable results
by apportioning fault according to the respective "fault" or "negligence" of the
parties. Duty/risk, by the same token, also sought fairness and "honesty" in
judicial policymaking, but arguably through a means opposed to the comparative
fault scheme. The duty/risk analysis did not seek to divide accurately the
respective negligence of two or more parties, but instead aimed at "subsuming"
or excluding the negligence of one party by manipulating the breadth of the other
party's duty. Indeed, on a more practical level, comparative fault seemed a
means of allowing a jury free rein in allocating what it perceived to be the just
measure of fault apportionment, while duty/risk seemed a powerful and efficient
mechanism for controlling whose fault juries considered at all.
B. The Johnson View of Duty/Risk
Professor Alston Johnson' viewed the duty/risk approach as a means of
regulating when comparative negligence should be applied to apportion the
respective fault of plaintiff-victim and defendant-tortfeasor. He noted that
comparative fault should only apply "[w]hen contributory negligence is
applicable to a claim for damages.""3 Under the Johnson rationale, the duty/risk
analysis itself was "the proper vehicle by which to determine the issue of
's
applicability of contributory or comparative negligence."'
According to Johnson, the co-existence of duty/risk and comparative fault
did not signal the complete abolition of the traditional bar of contributory
negligence. Rather, contributory negligence should still continue to bar
plaintiff's recovery when "plaintiff's conduct has created a situation such that
defendant could not possibly be expected to protect him against such risks.",'
That is to say, contributory negligence bars plaintiff's recovery when plaintiff's
own negligence has taken him outside the scope of defendant's duty. By the
same token, the court should not apply comparative fault to reduce even a
negligent plaintiff's recovery if "defendant's duty extends to the protection of
persons such as this careless plaintiff." 8
Johnson would leave apportionment of fault between plaintiff and defendant
to juries in a large number of cases, however. These cases would be instances
in which "[t]he law is not certain that the victim's fault should be wholly ignored
or that it should be held to create a situation as to which defendant has no duty
of protection."5 Johnson, along with Professor Leon Green, theorized that the
majority of such cases would arise out of traffic accidents, where the kaleido-

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See supra note 51.
La. Civ. Code a. 2323 (1979).
Johnson. supra note 51, at 339.
Id. Johnson classified such cases as "(by'cases. Id. at 334-37.
Id. at 340. Johnson classified such cases as "(a)" cases. Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 337. Johnson classified such cases as "(c)" cases. Id. at 337-38.
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scope of rules and duties, and the sheer mass of cases, operate to cloud the issue
of whose duty extends to what particular risks.' One could argue, in the
context of the Johnson's first two enumerated "classes," that the duty question
here is so uncertain as to become almost a question of "fact" best left to the
weighing capacities of the jury.
Johnson saw duty/risk as a bulwark against the "virtual abandonment to
juries of critical legal policy questions and surrender of all hope of uniformity
in the law."' Regardless of one's agreement with Johnson over the role and
capacity of the jury system, it is clear that Johnson conceived of the duty/risk
analysis as one by which the court would delimit a tortfeasor's duty before ever
allowing a jury to do so indirectly through apportionment of comparative fault.
Thus, according to Johnson, judges must jealously guard the prerogative given
them by the "tool" ofduty/risk, lest juries, subject to no control, become "master
of the law."' 2
C. The Robertson View of Duty/Risk
Professor David Robertson partly defined his view of the role of duty/risk
in a comparative fault context by negative reference to Johnson's view:
I believe that the Johnson view is mistaken. Virtually all of the
considerations Johnson would relegate to judges as part of the duty-risk
question of law are properly left to triers of fact as part of their
assessment of the degree of fault of the parties.63
.Robertson feared that the "retention of the duty-risk approach to victim
negligence questions entails the likelihood of the survival of the (by hypothesis
disapproved) avoidance doctrines under another name."' 0 In his view, the
advent of comparative fault was meant to do away with the contributory bar to
plaintiffs' recovery and to expunge from Louisiana tort law the "core meaning
of contributory negligence."' 5
Initially, Robertson noted that the shift from proximate cause language to the
duty/risk approach "was not centrally motivated or fueled by judicial concern
over victim-fault issues."" Instead, duty/risk was implemented by courts as a

60. Id.
61. Id. at 340.
62. Id.
63. David W. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative
Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 La.
L. Rev. 1341, 1342 (1984).

64.

Id. at 1360. The "avoidance doctrines" to which Professor Robertson alluded consist in

those arguably artificial logical manoevers (e.g. "last clear chance") through which courts sought to
avoid the effects of contributory negligence. See supra note 51.
65. Robertson, supra note 63, at 1364.
66. Id. at 1357.
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clearer, more straightforward alternative to the obscure language of proximate
cause. 67 But, as Robertson observed, the duty/risk approach
"soon commended
68
itself to courts as relevant to victim-fault problems."
Robertson articulated several problems with applying a duty/risk analysis
either to "forgive" a tortfeasor's negligence or to "forgive" a plaintiffs
contributing negligence. First, as noted above, he felt this approach effectively
preserved the "core meaning" of contributory negligence and kept alive the
discredited "avoidance doctrines" which had grown out of that system of precomparative fault law.' Second, he believed that, in many cases involving
victim-fault desirable results could be reached by finding that defendant was not
negligent,70 or that defendant's negligence was not a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs
injuries."
Professor Robertson rejected Johnson's view of duty/risk, arguing that the
duty/risk analysis was meant as a vehicle for a clearer expression of causation
in judicial opinions, and not as a tool for limiting the application of "pure"
comparative fault. Robertson argued that on a fundamental level the whole
concept of duty/risk was ill-suited to the victim-fault context. "[I]n this context,
the duty-risk approach is not a precise or evocative tool. It is too open-ended,
too general, and too unpredictable in its operation." '72 In the victim-fault
context, Robertson ascribed to duty/risk the same shortcomings with which
scholars had long attacked the doctrine of "assumption of the risk." He
concluded his argument with the broad statement that "even if these criticisms
are wrong, the application of duty-risk reasoning to the victim-fault issue clearly
makes multiparty cases too difficult."'
IV. SOLIDARITY AND DUTY/RISK

A. What (Exactly) is Solidarity?
When faced with a potentially thorny problem such as solidary liability, it
always seems comforting to take refuge in the Louisiana Civil Code. Article
1794 provides, "[a]n obligation is solidary for the obligors when each obligor is
liable for the whole performance." 74 By contrast, "[w]hen different obligors
owe together just one performance to one obligee, but neither is bound for the
whole, the obligation is joint for the obligors."75 Note, however, that "[w]hen

67.

See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Robertson, supra note 63, at 1357.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-40 and 51.
Robertson, supra note 63, at 1368-69.
Id. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
La. Civ. Code art. 1794.
La. Civ. Code art. 1788.
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a joint obligation is indivisible, joint obligors or obligees are subject to the rules
governing solidary obligors or solidary obligees."' 6 Thus, in determining
whether an obligation is "joint" or "solidary," it appears that one should focus
both on the relationship between the obligors themselves as well as on the
relationship between each obligor to the performance he owes.
Since the above articles are found in the Title of the Code dealing with
"Obligations in General," certain adjustments in language must be made to
apply these articles to the area of tort liability. Foremost, it should be clear that
the "performance" owed by a tortfeasor consists of damages arising from an
injury for which he is liable. Thus, one could say that two tortfeasors are
"solidarily" bound" to the extent that they are liable for the same damages.
This is so even if each tortfeasor's liability arises from a different source.79
In the past, Louisiana courts imposed solidary liability on two negligent
tortfeasors whose fault combined to cause an indivisible injury. An injury was
indivisible when "it was impossible to apportion the damages caused by the
tortfeasors between them."s But suppose a plaintiff suffers injuries from two
automobile accidents which are factually unrelated and occurred at different
times. These two accidents might well result in one indivisible injury to
plaintiff, insofar as specific injuries could not be reliably attributed to one
accident or the other. Were the two tortfeasors, then, bound in solido for the
plaintiff's injuries?

To answer this question Louisiana courts drew a distinction between a
situation in which two tortfeasors contributed concurrently to cause an indivisible
injury, and a situation in which they contributed successively to cause an

indivisible injury. In Hess v. Sports Publishing Company, the court observed
that:
Apportionment of damages may be almost impossible in basically
simultaneous accidents, such as chain reaction automobile collisions,
where the damages sustained cannot be properly evaluated between each
impact. In those instances, however, where the accidents do not occur
close in time, an assessment of the damages from the first accident
could or should be made prior to the second accident and would be
separable from any damages alleged to have been caused by the second
accident.8'

76.
77.

La. Civ. Code art. 1789.
La. Civ. Code, Book 111,Tide HII.

78. In Louisiana, two tortfeasors who are bound In solido may be referred to as "jointtortfeasors."
One must be careful to distinguish between "joint tortfeasors" (bound in solido) and "joint obligors"
(bound jointly). Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (1987) with La. Civ. Code arts. 1788-1790.
79. La. Civ. Code art 1797; see also Narcise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192 (La.

1983).
80. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Article 2324: The Discombobulating State ofSolidarity in Post
Tort Reform Louisiana, 54 La. L. Rev. 551, 553 (1994).
81. Hess v. Sports Publishing Co., 520 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
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The court was careful in Hess to point out that the two accidents were
"independent vehicular collisions, [and] the second accident did not arise from

nor was it a foreseeable consequence of the first.""2

Stated another way,

"whether a solidary relationship exists between two successive tortfeasors

depends on the original tortfeasor's scope of duty." 3

B. The Placeof Duty/Risk in the Solidary Liability Scheme
And so (sigh), the duty/risk inquiry enters the solidary liability picture. The
scope of the original tortfeasor's duty could possibly make him liable for
subsequent injuries caused even by a successive (as opposed to concurrent)
tortfeasor. For example, consider the traditional case where an original tortfeasor
becomes liable "not only for the injuries he directly causes to the tort victim, but
also for the tort victim's additional suffering caused by inappropriate treatment
by the doctor, nurse or hospital staff member who treats the injuries directly
caused by the tortfeasor."" Another example is the "theory premised upon the
rationale that if the victim, as a result of a weakened condition due to the
original injury, suffers a new accident and injury, the original tortfeasor is
accountable for the subsequent injury." 5 Both of these theories are based on
the idea that the scope of the original tortfeasor's duty included the risk that
subsequent injury would result from (1) medical malpractice or (2) a "weakened
condition" arising from the original injuries.
Professor Martha Chamallas" applied the Johnson view of duty/risk and
comparative fault to the problem of joint tortfeasors. She argued that the
introduction of "pure" comparative fault into Louisiana and the consequent
ability ofjuries to apportion the fault of joint tortfeasors "cannot and should not
be divorced from the considerations of policy that have influenced the courts to
expand or restrict the scope of the risks for which defendants will be held

liable."" As discussed above, Johnson saw the duty/risk analysis as a judicial
tool for limiting when juries could use comparative fault principles to apportion
fault between plaintiff and defendant. Chamallas had no difficulty applying the
same analysis to joint tortfeasors.

82. Id. The holding ofHess was affirmed recently in Jarreau v. Hirschey, 650 So. 2d 1189 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1994). Them, the First Circuit noted that "[s]olidary liability between tortfeasors does
not arise where each of the tortfeasors commits an entirely separate, negligent act." Jarreau, 650 So.
2dat 1194.
83. Nicholas Gachassin III, Casenote, Younger v. Marshall Industries, Inc.: An Extension to
Weber v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana, 39 Loy. L. Rev. 661, 666 (1993) (emphasis added).
84. Weber v. Charity Hosp. of Louisiana, 475 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (La. 1985).
85. Younger v. Marshall Indus., Inc., 618 So. 2d 866, 872 (La. 1993) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 460 (1965) and McCormick on Damages, § 76 (1935)).
86. Martha Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A
Sampling ofthe Problems, 40 La. L. Rev. 373 (1980).
87. Id. at 386.
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In her view, therefore, the duty/risk analysis should allow the court to "retain
its power to control the result, both with respect to the existence of liability as
well as the extent of liability... by permitting the court to conform the jury's
verdict to its own assessment of the scope of defendants' duties in the particular
case."8 Sometimes a jury would not be allowed to apportion fault between
joint tortfeasors because the court had determined that the duty of one joint
tortfeasor included (or totally excluded) the risk of the other's negligence.
The doctrines ofmedical malpractice and "weakened condition" liability can
be seen as traditional applications of duty/risk in the joint tortfeasor context.
Courts had determined that the duty breached by a tortfeasor generally
encompassed the risk of subsequent injury from medical malpractice or from a
"weakened condition." Duty/risk operated, as Chamallas envisioned, to
"conform" the scope of duty in a particular case to a generalized view of what
risks the breach of that duty ought to include.
C. Duty/Risk and Article 2324
Chamallas was writing in 1980, before the 1987 amendment to Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324." Recall that before 1987, any one of the joint
tortfeasors could be held liable for 100% of plaintiffs damages." In 1987,
however, the legislature amended Article 2324(B) with the intention of somehow
"limiting" the solidarity of joint tortfeasors "only to the extent necessary for the
person suffering injury, death or loss to recover fifty percent of his recoverable
damages."'" When Chamallas was writing her article, a "joint tortfeasor" could
be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. After the 1987 amendment to 2324,
a joint tortfeasor was liable "only to the extent necessary" for the plaintiff to
recover 50% of his damages.
What Article 2324 meant at the time of Chamallas' article (1980) is
important because of what was potentially "at stake" when a court construed the
duties ofjoint tortfeasors. For example, if a court decided in 1980 that, between
joint tortfeasors A and B, A's duty included the risk of B's negligence, then the
entire loss would be shifted to A, and consequently A would no longer have
contribution rights against B." That A could, under the court's appraisal of A's
duty, be liable for 100% of the damages did not matter much because A was
solidarily liable with B. Under pre-1987 Article 2324(B), A could have been
potentially liable for 100% in any case.

88.

Id. at 380-81.

89. 1987 La. Acts No. 373, § 1.
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (1870).
91. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1987).
92. See La. Civ. Code art. 1804. In 1980, when Article 2323 was amended to provide for
"pure" comparative fault, Article 1804 was also amended to make a solidary obligor's virile portion
"proportionate to the fault of each obligor" rather than determined on a per capita basis. See also
Galligan, supra note 80, at 553-54.
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Under Article 2324(B) as amended in 1987, a court's appraisal of A's duty
had different consequences. Under that version (1987) of Article 2324(B), given
joint tortfeasors A and B, each could be called upon to pay only 50% of the
plaintiff's damages.93 But imagine a court who, wielding the tool of duty/risk
to "conform the jury's verdict to its own assessment of the scope of defendant's
duties in the particular case,"" decided that although A and B were "technically"'9s joint tortfeasors, the scope of A's duty included the risk of B's negligence.
A would then have been liable for 100% of the damages, whereas if the court
had merely limited itself to pronouncing the two tortfeasors "bound in solido,"
each could only have been responsible (under the 1987 version of 2324(B)) for
50% of plaintiff's recoverable damages.
Under this scenario, the judicial control mechanism of duty/risk envisioned
by Johnson and Chamallas would have enabled a court to circumvent completely
the limitations on solidarity legislatively imposed by Article 2324(B), as amended
in 1987." It remains to be seen whether the courts will attempt to use this
"control mechanism" to side-step that most extreme limitation on solidary
liability between joint tortfeasors: its complete abolition by the recently amended
Article 2324(B).97
V. RECENT CASE LAW
A. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd.
On October 3, 1988, at 1:45 a.m. an intruder broke into the apartment that
Ms. Veazey was renting from Southmark Management Corporation." The
intruder entered through the bedroom window and raped Veazey. The rapist was
never identified.
Veazey sued Southmark in negligence, alleging (1) that Southmark had
misrepresented both the level of security at the apartment complex and the
number and nature of prior criminal acts occurring at the complex, and (2) that
Southmark had provided inadequate security. 9 At the close of the trial, the
trial court refused Southmark's request to submit a special interrogatory" ® to
the jury in order to allocate fault to the nonparty rapist. Although the jury

93.

See Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 982 n.6 (La. 1995).

94.

See supra note 88.

95. "Technically" insofar as each is responsible for all of plaintiff's damages. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-79.
96. Given that David Robertson was skeptical about the applicability of duty/risk to victim-fault
and comparative fault issues, one can only imagine what he would think of the application of the
duty/risk analysis by the court to create a "functional" solidarity that ignores the dictates of Article

2324(B). See supra text accompanying notes 63-73.
97. See Infra part VI.
98. Veasey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994).

99.
100.

Id. at 713.
Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C)(2). See Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 713-14 n.l.
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returned a somewhat inconsistent verdict on liability,"' the trial court nonetheless granted Veazey's motions "for clarification and JNOV, reallocating all of the
fault to. Southmark and finding it liable for the entire $180,000 reward."'"
The court of appeal affinned, finding no error either in the trial court's refusal
to submit the special interrogatory or in its reallocation of fault pursuant to the
JNOV.' °3
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari'0 to consider "whether
the fault of an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor: (1) can; and (2)
should, be compared by the finder of fact.' 'Ies The court noted that these
questions were "significant issues of first impression in this Court."" °

The court heldro that
while Louisiana law is broad enough to allow comparison of fault
between intentional tortfeasors and negligent tortfeasors, determination

of whether such a comparison should be made must be determined by
the trial court on a case by case basis, bearing in mind the public policy
concerns discussed herein. We further hold ... that comparison of

Southmark's negligence and the rapist's fault in this particular case is
not appropriate" m'
What is particularly relevant to this discussion are those "public policy concerns"
which the court identified as prohibiting comparison of intentional and negligent
fault in this particular case.
Specifically, the court found that "[f]irst, and foremost, the scope of
Southmark's duty to the plaintiff in this case clearly encompassed the exact risk
of the occurrence which caused damage to the plaintiff.""' 9 Arguably, this
statement is the real holding of Veazey. The intentional versus negligent fault
inquiry became irrelevant once the court decided that Southmark's duty to
101.

In response to one interrogatory the jury found Veazey free from fault, whereas in response

to another interrogatory thejury allocated 40% ofthe fault to Veazey. See Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 714
n.2.
102. Id. at 714.
* 103. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc., Ltd., 625 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
104. 633 So. 2d 158 (La. 1994).
105. Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 715.
106. Id.
107. This article is not about the difficult question of whether to compare intentional and
negligent fault, and so I will not spend any significant amount of time exploring that issue. For an
article which does address that question, see Scott Andrews, Premises Liability--Ie Comparison of
Fault Between Negligent and Intentional Actors, 55 La. L. Rev. 1149 (1995).
108. Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 720 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 719. As a second "policy concern," the court observed that apportionment of fault
in this case would effectively reduce the lessor's incentive to provide safety measures because "any
rational juror (would] apportion the lion's share ofthe fault to the intentional tortfeasor." Id. Third,
the court noted that Dean Prosser viewed intentional fault as different from negligence "not only in
degree but in kind, and in the social condemnation attached to it." Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at 462 (5th ed. 1984)).
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Veazey included the risk that an intruder would break into her apartment and
rape her. Realistically, the court could have pretermitted discussion of tie
comparative fault issue and held that, regardless of whether intentional md
negligent fault could be compared in general, such a comparison would be
inappropriate in this case, given the broad scope of the defendant's duty to tie
plaintiff.
The court thus employed the duty/risk approach as "the proper vehicle by
which to determine the issue of applicability of contributory or comparative
negligence."" 0 Focusing on the breadth of the apartment owner's duty, the
court effectively removed from the jury's consideration any comparison of the
negligence of one tortfeasor with the intentional fault of another."' Although
this case involved the concurrent fault of a defendant and a non-party tortfeasor,
the court in effect analogized to those victim-fault cases classified by Alston
Johnson as those in which "defendant's duty extends to the protection of persons
such as this careless plaintiff."" 2 By construing Southmark's duty to include
the phantom rapist's intentional fault, the court imposed its own perception of
"public policy concerns" on the jury's ability to apportion fault.
The court's broad duty/risk approach also enabled it to circumvent the
application of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B), which would have limited
the liability of each joint tortfeasor. From a theoretical standpoint, the
negligence of Southmark and the intentional fault of the rapist combined to
impact upon Veazey at the same time, the moment of the rape. Since each
tortfeasor should therefore be liable to Veazey for the same damages, under
Louisiana Civil Code article 1794 and the jurisprudence interpreting it,'
Southmark and the rapist would be bound in solido for Veazey's damages.
Under Article 2324(B) (1987) and Cavalier," 4 then, Veazey could have
demanded a maximum of only 50% of her recoverable damages from each joint
tortfeasor.
But, Southmark was found liable for 100% of the damages," s exactly as
it could have been before the 1987 amendment to Article 2324(B). How did the
supreme court pull such a neat trick, hurdling with one logical leap the dictates
of the Louisiana legislature? As we have seen, the court did so by invoking
"public policy concerns" which prohibited the comparison of fault in this
particular case. As the source of its wide discretion the court looked to the

110.
111.

Johnson, supra note 51, at 339. See supra text accompanying notes 54.62.
Indeed, the court pronounced: "Because we believe that intentional torts are of a

findamentally different nature than negligent torts, we find that atrue comparison of fault based on
an intentional act and fault based on negligence is, in many circumstances, not possible." Veazev,
650 So. 2d at 719-20. This statement seems to conflict with the court's "holding" that Louisiana
comparative fault doctrine is broad enough to permit comparison of intentional and negligent fault.
See supra text accompanying note 109.
112. Johnson, supra note 51. at 340. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
113. See supra discussion in part IV.A.
114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
115. Vea=ey, 650 So. 2d at 714.
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"substantive principle of comparative fault" which "left the particulars of its
application for the courts to decide.""' 6 Thus, using duty/risk as its yardstick,
the court was able to shape what it perceived the extent of Southmark's liability,
and Veazey's recovery, should be." 7
Dissenting in Veazey, Justice Lemmon speculated on the hidden motivations
for the court's decision:
The solidarity prescribed by the Civil Code for joint tortfeasors is the
underlying reason why the majority refuses to consider an intentional
tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor as joint tortfeasors (although the
fault of each unquestionably combined to produce a single injury).
Because the Legislature in 1987 placed a limitation on solidarity, the
result of comparing the fault of an intentional tortfeasor with that of a
negligent tortfeasor is to reduce the tort victim's recovery when the
negligent tortfeasor is solvent and the intentional tortfeasor is an
insolvent or unidentified criminal. Nevertheless, the fact that the
Legislature. has seen fit to limit the civilian concept of solidarity should
not induce this court to vary from our consistent policy of applying
comparative fault across the board, at least as between tortfeasors.1'
Justice Lemmon argued that both the guidance of the legislature and the
need for consistent application of the comparative fault scheme dictated that the
fault of the joint tortfeasors should be compared in the case at bar."' He
disagreed with the majority's contention that "intentional torts [were] of a
fundamentally different nature than negligent torts."'20 He also pointed out that
the court had applied comparative fault in the "much more conceptually difficult"
situation involving a negligent plaintiff and a strictly liable defendant.'
Justice Lemmon provided not only substantive reasons for disagreeing with
the majority, but also gave insight into possible motivations underlying the
majority's view. Indeed, Lemmon's concurrence pointed to a tension between
the majority's view and the legislative intent embodied in amended Article
2324(B). The majority, faced with a situation where strict adherence to the
limiting provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code would saddle a wholly innocent
victim with the burden of an unavailable tortfeasor, was perhaps unwilling to
abandon Ms. Veazey to the harsh consequences of positive law. In Justice

116. Id. at 716.
117. For another discussion of the court's usc of duty/risk in Veazey and in Turnerv. Massiha,
Infra, see Maraist and Galligan, supra note 1,at 226-27.
Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 729 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
118.
119. Id. at 729-30. Justice Hall (joined by Judge Marvin, pro tern.) dissented on similar grounds,
arguing that the joint tortfeasors' fault should be compared and that Southmark's liability "must be
limited to 50% of plaintiff's recoverable damages." Id. at 724.
120. Id. at 719. See supranote 112.
121.
Veazey, 650 So. 2d at 730 (discussing Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 520 So. 2d 715 (La.
1988) and Landry v. Louisiana, 495 So. 2d 1284 (LA 1986)).
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Lemmon's view, this was an unwarranted indulgence on the majority's part and,
furthermore, a departure from law and precedent.
One can readily subscribe to Justice Lemmon's point of view. A wariness
about using the discretionary power of the judiciary to shape liability according
to "public policy concerns" underlies his dissent. After all, the legislature, and
not the judiciary, is more suited to formulating what "policies" are relevant in
apportioning liability and accident costs. This should be doubly true in the area
of solidary liability, where the legislature has affirmatively spoken. By amending
2324(B) in 1987, the Louisiana legislature curtailed long-established rights
against joint tortfeasors and shifted half of the burden of an insolvent or
unavailable party to the victim. One might ask, as Justice Lemmon seemed to,
why the court should use a jurisprudentially-fashioned tool, the duty/risk analysis,
to subvert what the legislature did to solidarity in 1987.
One might also question the court's use of the duty/risk method and
specifically its view of where the "duty" question fits into the liability analysis.
Immediately after announcing its broad holding that "public policy considerations
...compel us to find... that such a comparison (i.e. intentional and negligent
fault) should not be made in this particular case,'"" the court identified the
first of these "public policy considerations" as "the scope of Southmark's duty
to the plaintiff."'2 But it may be neither accurate nor helpful to classify the
scope of a defendant's duty as a "policy question."
As employed in Dixie Drive It Yourself,'2 a supposed advantage of the
duty/risk analysis was that it would clarify which "policy considerations" went
into a judge's decision to impose liability. To include "duty" in a laundry list
of policy considerations, however, is to put the cart before the horse. It is the
duty inquiry itselfwhich is supposed to elucidate the policy concerns of a court,
not the other way around. If we make the extent of a tortfeasor's duty a "policy
concern," then "duty" itself becomes simply another ingredient in an inscrutable
judicial recipe that may or may not lead to liability. If the duty/risk analysis is
used in this way, then what is the real difference between it and the "vagaries"
of proximate cause language? Would there be any reason to have duty/risk at
all?
Even with these reservations, however, there is some "common sense" logic
to the result in Veazey. Using the language of the Hill court, 12 there isan
"ease ofassociation" between the apartment owner's negligence and the resulting
damage to the victim. An apartment owner who breached his duty to provide
adequate security for his complex, which is located in a high-risk area, could
"reasonably anticipate" that one of his tenants might be raped as a result of his
negligent conduct. If a lawmaker were enacting a statute which imposed such

122. ,eazey, 650 So. 2d at 719.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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a duty on an apartment owner, the lawmaker might well contemplate the exact
risk which Ms. Veazey encountered. Additionally, past decisions of Louisiana
courts which, in dicta, might have found an apartment manager liable for
criminal activity on his premises" 6 could be read to impose a duty on Southmark in this case.
Also, the "equities" of the situation militated in favor of sticking Southmark
with the entire bill. Imposing liability on Southmark for the full extent of the
rapist's fault would presumably serve as a strong deterrent to future negligent
conduct. Otherwise, as the court noted,127 given the opportunity to compare
the fault of a negligent apartment owner and a violent criminal, any rational jury
would apportion the "lion's share" of the fault to the rapist. The fact that the
rapist had not even been identified was an important, but not a crucial,
factor."' Even if the rapist had been before the court, it is unlikely that he
could have made any meaningful contribution to pay his share of Ms. Veazey's
damages.
What remains, then, is a questionable application of the duty/risk analysis
by the court to achieve an apparently just result. As with any judicial decision,
however, it is the language of the court, and not the specific result, which may
have lasting implications. The question of comparing intentional and negligent
fault is a difficult one with which courts will wrestle for years to come. The
more insidious aspect of Veazey, however, is the court's use of the duty/risk
analysis to shape the liability of joint tortfeasors, and this part of the decision
may have wider repercussions. Courts could read the opinion as an invitation to
apply a broad duty/risk analysis outside the specific facts of Veazey, thus
usurping much of the legislature's control over the area of fault apportionment
and solidary liability. The next case discussed may provide an example of such
overbroad use of the duty/risk analysis.
B. Turner v. Massiha
Drs. Massiha and Ward each examined Mrs. Turner on separate occasions,
and neither thought that a hardening in Turner's right breast was serious enough
to merit "diagnostic tests."2 9 Massiha examined Turner in 1984 and 1986, and
Ward saw her in 1985 and 1987. Neither doctor conferred with the other, nor
did one doctor send Turner to the other. In 1987, other doctors discovered
cancer in Turner's right breast and performed a mastectomy. At that point, the

126. See, e.g., Carline v. Lewis, 400 So. 2d 1167 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Thompson v. Cane
Gardens Apartments, 442 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
127. See supra note 110.
128. Article 2323 in its present form would mandate that the rapist's fault be quantified,
notwithstanding that his "identity (was] not kmown or reasonably ascertainable." La. Civ. Code art.
2323(A).
129. Turner v. Massiha, 656 So. 2d 636, 637 (La. 1995). Dr. Massiha's last name is incorrectly
spelled "Massiah" in the caption to the case.
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cancer was "Stage 2," and Turner only had a 25% chance of living. 30 She
filed suit against Drs. Massiha and Ward for medical malpractice.
The jury attributed 60% of the fault to Massiha and 40% to Ward and
awarded total general damages of $1,020,000.
The trial court used the
tortfeasors' respective percentages of fault to divide the damages.' 3' Additionally, the court applied two damage caps of $500,000 to each doctor's damages,
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42.32 Ward settled with
Turner and his insurer for $100,000, and therefore an additional $308,000 was
paid to Turner on his behalf from the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund.
Massiha's insurer was held liable for $100,000, with the Fund paying Turner
$400,000 on his behalf. Thus, after the application of comparative fault and the
two damage caps, Turner recovered $808,000 from the two doctors, including the
$100,000 settlement with Ward. The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's damage award and its use of two damage
caps. 133
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the Fund's petition for writs,
contending that only one damage cap should apply to the total damage award.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeal, holding that, although the two
doctors had committed separate negligent acts, the injury that resulted was
indivisible and was thus susceptible to only one damage cap.' 34 So, the Fund
was liable for only $500,000, the maximum allowed by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.42.
The majority emphasized the distinction between apportionment of fault and
"legal cause."' 35 Justice Yelverton, writing for the majority, asserted that the
court of appeal had erred by using the jury's assignment of percentages of fault
(60% to Massiha, 40% to Ward) to apportion damages between the two
tortfeasors.'36 The appeals court, in the majority's view, had overlooked "[t]he
fact that the relative culpability of the providers can be assigned a percentage
does not mean that in terms of legal cause each provider was not responsible for
the whole injury."' 37 These two ideas lay at the heart of the majority's
position: the principle of "legal cause" and the corollary notion that each doctor
was responsible for "the whole injury" or "the entire damage."
Through the majority's adoption of the "legal cause" rationale, the duty/risk
method insinuated itself into the opinion:

130. Id.
131. Of the total $1,020,000 in damages, Massiha was responsible for $612,000 and Ward for
$408,000. Id. at 638.
132. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(BXI) provides: "The total amount recoverable for all malpractice
claims for injuries to or death of a patient, exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as
provided in R.S. 40:1299.43, shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest and cost."
133.

Turner v. Massiha, 641 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994).

134.
135.

Turner, 656 So. 2d at 641.
Id. at 640.

136.

Id.

137.

Id. at 639.
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Legal causation in medical malpractice cases is decided under a
duty/risk analysis. Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 93-1359 (La.
3/21/94), 634 So. 2d 331. Dr. Massiha's misdiagnosis was a cause-infact of the Stage 2 cancer. His duty was to correctly diagnose. The
risk of injury for failure to diagnose correctly was Stage 2 cancer. The
duty to avoid a misdiagnosisincluded the risk that another health care
providermight also misdiagnose. Dr. Massiha could have prevented the
damage by making a proper diagnosis. Therefore, he was liable for all
damage resulting. The same analysis is applicable to Dr. Ward." 8
Applying this analysis, the majority was satisfied that Dr. Massiha and Dr.
Ward were each responsible for all of the damages to Turner. And although a
colorable implication of that analysis was that the doctors were solidary
obligors,' the majority made the interesting assertion that the tortfeasors'
liability was "based on more than the imposition of a solidary obligation between
joint tortfeasors; his (Massiha's) liability for all of the victim's damages resulted
because he was the legal cause of all of the victim's harm. Lambert v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 629 So. 2d 328 (La. 1993). " 40
The majority then explained that the injury caused by both doctors was
indivisible. Given that the cancer was the "slow growing kind," and that "[n]o
one could say when the cancer started," it would be impossible to determine
what part of the plaintiff's damages were attributable to which tortfeasor.' 4'
Therefore, two independent acts of negligence had combined to produce one
indivisible injury. The court read the limiting language of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) and (2) so that "for one patient and one injury there
is but one cap."" Given that reasoning, the court of appeal's application of
two statutory caps was held to be error.
The correctness of the majority's conclusion that only one damage cap
applied to the two tortfeasors is not the pertinent question here. What is

138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. I.e., under the majority's analysis, one could argue that each doctor was obligated to the
plaintiff for the same damages, and that therefore under La. Civ. Code art. 1794 they were bound In
$olido for that obligation. The crucial question, however, would be whether the tortfeasors were
concurrentor successive. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
140. Turner, 656 So. 2d at 639.
141. Id. at 640. The court opined from jury interrogatories that "each doctor misdiagnosed the
cancer at a time when its discovery would have afforded Janice Turner an 80-90% chance of
survival." IM When the cancer was finally discovered, Turner's chances for survival had dropped
to 25%. Thus, a major portion of the damages could be said to consist in the "loss" of a 55-65%
chance of survival which each doctor's misdiagnosis denied to Turner. The thrust of the court's
assertion here is apparently that since it is impossible to assess what chance of survival Turner had
when each independent act of negligence occurred, it is consequently impossible to divide the
damages. "Apportioning or separating the injuries caused by one of the doctors from the injuries
caused by the other simply cannot be done." Id.
142. ld. at 641.
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relevant, however, is the majority's use of the duty/risk analysis and the impact
that analysis could have on the question of solidary liability. In Veazey, the
majority used the duty/risk analysis to burden the negligent tortfeasor with all of
the intentional tortfeasor's fault. The use of duty/risk analysis in this case may
be a logical extension of the Veazey rationale, this time to a situation involving
two negligent tortfeasors.
In a footiote to the opinion,'43 the court gave two reasons why Louisiana
Civil Code article 2324(B) (1987) would not be applicable to the situation at
hand, thus not requiring quantification of the two doctors' fault. First, the court
aptly observed that since the facts of the case occurred before the effective date
of the 1987 amendment to Article 2324, and since the amendment was not
retroactive, the article could not apply.'" The court's second observation was
more interesting, however:
...

applying Lambert, 629 So. 2d 328, when a tortfeasor is the legal

cause of 100% of the victim's harm, his liability for 100% of the
.victim's harm is based on more than the imposition of a solidary
obligation between joint tortfeasors, and an apportionment of fault
cannot relieve him of responsibility for damages for which he is the
legal cause.4 The amendment to La.Civ.Code art. 2324 has not changed
1
this result.

1

Of course the "amendment" to which the majority referred was the 1987
change to Article 2324(B) which limited the liability ofjoint tortfeasors "only to
the extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death or loss to recover fifty
percent ofhis recoverable damages."'"' The gist of the court's statement was that
the two tortfeasors were not solidarily bound at all. Even if the 1987 amendment
to Article 2324(B) applied, it would not be necessary to quantify each tortfeasor's
fault because each was responsible for 100% of the victim's damages.
The first thing that must be observed about the majority's second reason for not
applying 2324(B) (1987) is that it was dicta. The facts of Turnerarose before the
1987 amendment to Article 2324, and the limiting portion of 2324(B) (1987)
clearly did not apply. The second half offootnote three was therefore unnecessary
to resolve whether two damage caps or one should apply or even whether the fault
of the two tortfeasors should be quantified. The implications of the majority's
reasoning, however, cannot be ignored.
Suppose that the facts of Turneractually arose after the effective date of the
1987 amendment to Article 2324(B), but before its complete evisceration in 1996.
The issue ofwhether 2324(B) (1987) should apply would then have been squarely
before a court deciding the question. Given what the Louisiana Civil Code articles

143. Id. at 640 n.3.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146.

La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1987).
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on solidarity and the jurisprudence interpreting them have taught us, what
principled decision should a court have made?
First, under a literal reading ofLouisiana Civil Code article 1794, Drs. Massiha
and Ward should be considered solidary obligors. After all, the Turnercourt stated
that "[t]he negligence of each provider in this case was the legal cause ofthe entire
damage"; " 7 therefore, each tortfeasor was "liable for the whole performance.' " But remember the distinction between concurrent and successive
tortfeasors emphasized in Hess v. Sports PublishingCo.' 41 The two doctors in
Turner did not act upon the body of the victim at the same time, thus it could be
argued that they were not "concurrent" tortfeasors. Instead, they committed
independent acts ofnegligence and were therefore "successive" tortfeasors. Under
the Hess rationale, then, if it were possible to divide the damages between the
successive tortfeasors, then the court should do so." So, if some of Turner's
injuries could be reliably attributed to Dr. Massiha and others to Dr. Ward, then a
court should so separate the damages, and no solidary relationship would exist
between the tortfeasors.
Recall, however, that the Turner majority took great pains to demonstrate that
there was no hope of dividing up the damages, given the impossibility of knowing
when the cancer started and the rate at which it had progressed."' Accepting this
assertion as true, it would seem to be more equitable to treat the two doctors as
conncurrent tortfeasors and hold them solidarily liable for Turner's damages, absent
some affirmative showing that the damages could be divided between them." 2
The Hess court explicitly found that the two accidents at issue there "were
independent vehicular collisions, [and] the second accident did not arise from nor
was it a foreseeable consequence of the first." '53 In other words, the duty
violated by the first tortfeasor in Hess (negligent driving) did not include the risk
that the victim would be involved in a second, unrelated automobile accident. So,
a court should ask itself, as the Turner court did, whether the duty violated by Dr.
Massiha (negligent misdiagnosis) included the risk of Dr. Ward's subsequent,

factually unrelated misdiagnosis. Of course, the Turner court answered "yes" to
this question, but without providing a single reason why.' 4 That conclusion
presents a number of problems.

147.

Turner,656 So. 2d at 639.

148.

La. Civ. Code art. 1794.

149.

520 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 523 So. .2d 1343 (1988). See supratext

accompanying notes 81-83.
150. Hess, 520 So. 2d at 474.
151. See supranote 143.
152. This approach would resemble the approach of the California Supreme Court in Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d I (Cal. 1948), in which the two defendants were given the burden
of proving they were not jointly and severally liable to plaintiff when defendants had wounded
plaintiff with simultaneous blasts from two shotguns.
153. Hess. 520 So. 2d at 474.
154. Turner, 656 So. 2d at 639.
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First, why should the duty violated by a misdiagnosing doctor necessarily
include the risk that another doctor would misdiagnose the same patient for the
same condition? If "ease of association" is the benchmark, then the question
would be whether one doctor who misdiagnoses a patient could "reasonably
anticipate" that another doctor would also misdiagnose the same patient. By tie
same token, if a lawmaker were drafting a rule of law which prohibited a doctor
from misdiagnosing a patient, the question would be whether the lawmaker had
in mind preventing the risk that another doctor would subsequently misdiagnose
the same patient. It is difficult to come up with a plausible reason for answering
"yes" to either question. And yet the Turner majority did not hesitate in
construing Dr. Massiha's duty to include the risk of Dr. Ward's subsequent
negligence.
The majority classified Turner as a "medical malpractice" case.", One
might argue, however, that Turner is not a "medical malpractice case" at all.
The majority was plainly analogizing to casess in which the scope of a
negligent tortfeasor's duty was held held to include the risk that a treating
physician would subsequently commit malpractice on the tort victim. One
noteworthy example of such a case is Weber v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana,3 in which the victim of an automobile accident was subjected to further
negligence when she contracted hepatitis through a blood tranfusion used to treat
her injuries. The court, with Justice Lemmon writing for the majority, found that
the duty violated by a negligent driver included the risk that "the tort victim's
injuries might be worsened by the treatment for those injuries. ""' s Therefore,
the court concluded that the negligent driver was solidarily liable with the
hospital and blood bank for those damages caused by the negligent transfusion.
But the situation presented in cases like Weber was simply different from
the Turnersituation, and the different circumstances required different treatment.
In a Weber-like case, courts had consistently held that the duty of a tortfeasor
who negligently injures someone "may extend to the risk involved in the human
fallibility of physicians, surgeons, nurses and hospital staffs which is inherent in
the necessity of seeking medical treatment."' 9 The foregoing statement
emphasizes the important causal relationship between the injury and the

treatment: "... inherent in the necessity of seeking medical treatment." 0 In

155. The Turner majority cited Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 634 So. 2d 331 (La. 1994), as
authority for its application of the duty/risk analysis to "medical malpractice cases." Turner, 656 So.
2d at 639.
156. See, e.g., Younger v. Marshall Industries, Inc., 618 So. 2d 866 (La. 1993); Weber v.Charity
Hospital of Louisiana, 475 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1985); Littleton v. Montelepre Extended Care Hospital,
657 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 661 So. 2d 499 (1995).
157. 475 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1985).
158. Id. at 1050.
159. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 (1965)); see also Younger v. Marshall
Industries, 618 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. 1993) and Littleton v. Montelepre Extended Care Hospital, 657
So. 2d 572, 573 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 661 So. 2d 499 (1995).
160. Weber, 475 So. 2d at 1050 (emphasis added).
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formulating such a duty, courts might have appreciated that injury generally
involves subsequent, often immediate, treatment, and that the risk associated with
medical malpractice is thus closely related, both temporally and logically, to the
original tortfeasor's breach of duty. One might fairly say, in good legalese, that
there is an "ease of association" between the duty violated and the risk
encountered.
If there is any association between the duty violated and the risk encountered
in Turner, it is certainly not "easy." Only a profoundly bleak view of the
medical community could "reasonably anticipate" one act of misdiagnosis
flowing naturally from another. And yet it is on this hook that the Turner
majority hung its hat. Perhaps the majority was preoccupied with the thorny
issue of whether to apply multiple malpractice caps to appreciate the conceptual
damages its questionable dicta might wreak. In any case, it is dicta that
overstates the duty violated by a doctor who misdiagnoses his patient and should
be strictly limited in future application.
One potential fallout that emerged in the Turner opinion itself was the effect
of the majority's rationale on the application of Article 2324(B) (1987). As
observed above, the majority applied Lambert v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. 6' for the proposition that, given the two doctors' "overlapping" duties,
each was responsible for the whole injury "based on more than the imposition
of a solidary obligation between joint tortfeasors."' 62 Given Lambert, then, the
majority concluded that 2324(B) (1987) would not apply 63 to mandate the
quantification of each tortfeasor's fault.
A court deciding whether 2324(B) (1987) should have applied to the Turner
situation would have been well instructed by Justice Lemmon's concurrence in
Turner. Justice Lemmon realized that the question of whether two damage caps
should apply was separate from the hypothetical question of whether amended
2324(B) (1987) would mandate quantification of fault.'" He disagreed with
the majority, maintaining that "[w]hen there is a single injury caused by two
tortfeasors' failure to act and action by either would have prevented the injury,
fault must be quantified."" s
Justice Lemmon pointed out that Lambert was a per curiam opinion that
merely recognized the viability of the Weber doctrine after the amendment to
Article 2324(B) (1987) and the supreme court's decision in Gauthier v.
O'Brien.'" Lambert held that a negligent tortfeasor could not obtain a

161.
162.
163.

629 So. 2d 328 (La. 1993). See supra notes 142 and 147.
Turner v. Massiha, 656 So. 2d 636, 639 (La. 1995) (quoting Lambert, 629 So. 2d at 328).
L.e., had the facts of the case arisen after the 1987 amendment to 2324(B) and before the

1996 amendment.
164. Lemmon asserted that "this point of disagreement (i.e., the application of Lambert to the
question ofwhether the doctors' fault should be quantified) makes no difference in the present case."

Turner, 656 So. 2d at 641 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
165.
166.

Id.
618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993). See Lambert, 629 So. 2d at 328.
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reduction of plaintiff's recovery when plaintiff, in a separate action, was seeking
damages caused by a second tortfeasor's negligence who had subsequently
treated plaintiff's injuries." 7 Lambert specifically recognized that the two
tortfeasors were still solidarily liable to the extent of the malpractice damages
and that quantification of fault was necessary for determining contribution rights
between the tortfeasors.'"
When it is clear what Lambert actually held, one can understand Justice
Lemmon's objection to the majority's use of the case. In Turner, the majority
found that fault should not be quantified and implicitly, that there should be no
contribution rights between the tortfeasors. A strict adherence to Lambert and
Weber would have mandated a contrary conclusion and allowed application of'
2324(B) (1987) to quantify the tortfeasors' fault. Instead, the Turner majority
used the duty/risk analysis to construe each tortfeasor's duty as including the risk
of the other's negligence. The ultimate result of such a rationale was to
effectively circumvent the application of Article 2324(B) (1987)'to a case where
the negligence of two tortfeasors combined to cause a single, indivisible injury.
VI. CONCLUSION: DUTY/RISK AND AMENDED ARTICLE 2324(B)

Ironically, the last several pages struggle to discern why the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, employed the duty/risk analysis as it did.
It is ironic because, as discussed earlier, one raison d'etre of the duty/risk
analysis was that it would clarify the policy reasons underlying judicial decisions.
Paradoxically, the court's approach in Veazey and Turner may have actually
muddied the waters rather than cleared them up.

167. See Turner,656 So. 2d at 641 n.I (Lemmon, J.,
concurring).
168. "The imposition ofsolidarity between the original tortfeasor and the subsequently treating
health care provider in Weber regognized the tortfeasor's right to seek contribution from the health care
provider. The action for contribution is still available to the original tortfeasor, and in this action the
apportionment of fault is necessary. As between these parties each is liable only for his virile share."
Lambert, 629 So. 2d at 329.
The gist of the Lambert opinion was that the original tortfeasor was still liable for 100% of the
victim's damages, notwithstanding the 1987 amendment to 2324(B). One could explain this conclusion
by observing that this type of "total" solidarity survived the 1987 amendment because it is solidarity
"otherwise provided by law." La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1987). A colorable argument could be made,
however, that the solidarity for malpractice damages found in cases like Weber was no different than
any other solidarity and therefore should be subject to the limiting language of2324(B) (1987). Under
that interpretation, then, the original tortfeasor and the subsequently negligent doctor would have been
bound in solido "only to the extent necessary... to recover fifty percent of(the victim's) recoverable
damages." Id. The "recoverable damages" would have been those damages caused by the malpractice.
Now, under the current version of 2324(B), the original tortfeasor and the subsequently malpracticing
doctor should not be solidarily bound at all. The legislature itself removed any textual basis for the
continued viability of this "traditional" type of solidarity when it removed the language "otherwise
provided by law" from Article 2324(B). See La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1987). One might ask whether
the legislature intended to make such a profound change to a relatively well-settled concept oftort law.
See Gachgassin, supra note 83; see also infra part VI.
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If one imagines that the use of duty/risk in Veazey was given its "logical"
extension in Turner, then the future may not bode well for the analysis so well
employed in Dixie Drive It Yourself While the Veazey court used the duty of
a negligent tortfeasor to make him liable for the fault of an intentional tortfeasor,
at least the conclusion seemed "principled." It did not tax the imagination to
make a negligent apartment owner pay for a criminal act his own substandard
behavior had aided and abetted. Perhaps the simple gut reaction that the decision
was just," given the peculiar circumstances, was enough to justify the court's
questionable use of "duty" as a "policy concern."
Veazey, however, involved the peculiar factual situation in which an
intentional and a negligent tortfeasor concurrently caused an indivisible
injury.'" Should a court take the next logical step and apply the Veazey
rationale to a situation where a negligent tortfeasor's duty is "made to include"
the risk of subsequent negligence, then vague assertions of "duty" like the one
made in Turner might become the rule, rather than the exception. A free-for-all
approach to duty/risk could result in situations where courts make a negligent
tortfeasor responsible for all manner of harm, regardless of where the legislature
might have seen fit to limit his liability.
In light of amended Articles 2323 and 2324, the simple question presents
itself: have the amended articles left courts any room whatsoever to characterize
the duty of one negligent defendant as including the risk of another defendant's
negligence? New Article 2323(A) mandates that the degree of fault of "all
persons causing or contributing to the injury, death or loss shall be determined... ."7 New Article 2324(B) in turn makes liability for damages
caused by two or more persons (unless they conspired to commit an intentional
tort under 2324(A)) a "joint and divisible obligation": a joint tortfeasor, then,
"shallnot be liable for more than his degree of fault and shall not be solidarily
liable with any other person ... ." ' Solidary liability in tort, then, could
apparently arise only in the context of Article 2324(A): no longer can solidarity
arise "as otherwise provided by law."'"
These articles purport to deny a court any opportunity to shape the respective
liabilities ofjoint tortfeasors according to the court's view of "duty" or "risk."
The intriguing question will be how courts respond to this legislative gauntlet.
Historically, as this comment has sought to illustrate, the duty/risk analysis was
a means by which courts gathered power unto themselves, at the expense of

169. Article 2323(C) now provides that "if a person suffers injury, death or loss as a result partly
of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for

recovery of damages shall not be reduced." This apparently means that there will be no comparison
of fault between the negligent plaintiff and the intentional tortfeasor defendant. Presumably,

however, this new provision will have no effect on the comparison of fault between two defendants,
one liable for negligence and the other liable for intentional fault.
170. La. Civ. Code art. 2323(A) (emphasis added).
171. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (emphasis added).
172. C. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1987).
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juries and legislatures. Courts found both a ready tool with which to shape a
jury's apportionment of fault between joint tortfeasors and also a clever avenue
for circumventing the legislature's attacks on solidarity itself. Now it remains
to be seen whether the utility of the duty/risk analysis will end, or whether evervigilant courts will find other, more fertile areas for its application.
In any case, if courts continue to use the duty/risk analysis in an offhand
way-without carefully explaining why a tortfeasor's duty is relatively broad or
narrow, or perhaps by making a casual reference to "duty" in a laundry list of
judicial "reasons" for liability-then the approach will cease to have any function
at all. If "duty" becomes another buzzword, to be shelved dustily along with
other formulae like "foreseeability" or "ease of association" or (gasp!) "proximate cause," it will signify that a long jurisprudential journey beginning with
Dixie Drive It Yourself has ended, back where it started, with conclusions
masquerading as reasons.
Kyle Duncan

